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1 INTRODUCTION  
Critical infrastructure (CI) may be defined as those 
assets or systems that are critical for the maintenance 
of vital societal functions, providing services that 
society and citizens rely on in their daily life (EC, 
2008) - i.e. power and water supply systems, 
healthcare, transport, electronic communications sys-
tems, banking. In current literature and discussion on 
Emergency Management (EM) of CI a shift of em-
phasis has appeared from protecting the systems to 
maintaining their resilience. Resilience approaches 
are built on the assumption that not all disruptive 
events involving CI systems can be prevented. We 
adopt the following definition of resilience (Kozine 
& Andersen, 2015): “The resilience of a CI system is 
its ability to  
− reduce the chances of a disruption of its perfor-
mance and service to the public,  
− absorb the consequences of any shock or disrup-
tion if it occurs,  
− recover quickly after a shock or disruption by re-
establishing normal performance and service, 
and when relevant, to  
− adapt to unforeseen crisis scenarios and possibly 
significantly different circumstances of opera-
tion”. 
 
A number of conceptual frameworks have 
emerged that aim at demonstrating different, interre-
lated aspects of systems’ resilience rather than serv-
ing as operational guidance for assessment of the re-
silience. Notable are the MCEER1 framework for 
quantitative assessment and enhancement of the 
seismic resilience of communities (Bruneau, et al. 
2003) and the Sandia resilience assessment frame-
work applied to infrastructure and economic systems 
(Vurgin, et al. 2010). While providing constructive 
guidelines for resilience assessment, they are loosely 
coupled to the EM set-ups and activities practiced by 
EM agencies and emergency responders.  
The present study aims at improving the planning 
and assessment of the resilience capacities to address 
the challenges raised by disruptions affecting com-
plex CI systems. It was developed in the context of 
the READ Project2 (Resilience Capacities Assess-
ment for Critical Infrastructures Disruptions). The 
stakeholders and beneficiaries of READ are the 
emergency management and civil protection authori-
ties, first responders, CI operators, and the main pub-
lic authorities in charge of CIP-R programmes. 
                                                 
1 MCEER is the Multidisciplinary and National Center for 
Earthquake Engineering Research at University of Buffalo 
2 The READ Project (http://www.read-project.eu/) is co-
funded by the European Commission under the Prevention, 
Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and 
other Security-related Risks Programme. 
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ABSTRACT:  
Recent developments nurturing the importance of Emergency Management (EM) of Critical Infrastructure 
(CI) brought a shift of emphasis from protecting the systems to building resilience. Resilience approach is re-
quired to cope with inevitable events, ensuring ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover 
from a potentially disruptive event. The study proposes a novel approach to integrating the resilience capaci-
ties of CI into the EM cycle, which facilitates emergency services and CI operators to collaborate in address-
ing resilience improvement measures, while planning to cope with CI disruptions. It grounds on a previously 
published comprehensive framework which reflects the main characteristics of such emergencies (e.g. inter-
dependent, multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder) and supports the identification, assessment and development of 
specific technical and organizational capabilities. A pilot application is provided on a real case involving the 
public and private actors engaged in the Regional Programme on Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resili-
ence (CIP-R) in Lombardy (Italy). 
 
 
Our approach integrates the resilience capabilities 
of CI into the EM cycle (prevention, preparedness, 
response, and recovery), which allows emergency 
services to explicitly address resilience improvement 
measures while planning to cope with CI disrup-
tions. An overall resilience capability building cycle 
completes the framework, enabling a systematic im-
plementation of relevant capabilities and making gap 
analysis with regard to resilience deficits. The plan-
ning of training exercises to enhance CI resilience 
can also benefit from the approach. 
The project supports the stakeholders involved in the 
EM of Critical Infrastructure disruptions through: 
− characterizing transboundary emergency situations 
involving interdependent CI systems; 
− identifying, characterizing and assessing the resili-
ence capacities required to prepare, cope and re-
cover from these type of disruptions; 
− improving practices and capabilities. 
 
To practically support READ target groups, the 
project will provide a tool to effectively assess their 
resilience capacities (in preparedness, response and 
recovery phases) and identify the areas where actions 
and efforts are needed to improve the emergency 
management set-up. 
In the present paper, we focus on the development 
of the READ tool, grounding on the READ frame-
work that has been validated through an international 
focus group (Kozine & Andersen, 2015). 
The reminder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. The next section gives a short summary of the 
READ framework. Section 3 describes the case that 
will be used for the tool pilot testing. Some data col-
lected for this case are used in Section 4 for a realis-
tic demonstration of the tool’s structure and func-
tionalities. The final section briefly summarizes the 
progress and presents the future steps.  
2 INTEGRATION OF CI RESILIENCE 
CAPABILITIES IN THE EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT SET-UP: THE READ 
FRAMEWORK 
The full overview READ framework and the defini-
tion of its constituents have already been published 
in Kozine & Andersen (2015). In this section we 
summarise the main concepts necessary for a full 
understanding of the resilience assessment tool. 
2.1 Resilience Capabilities 
A Resilience Capability of an entity (organization, 
person, system) is a feature, faculty or process that 
promotes the achievement of its resilience objec-
tives. The definition of a resilience capability is fur-
ther deepened and operationalized. The Framework 
breaks it down into the following three related com-
pounds: assets, resources, and practices/routines.  
These terms, assets, resources and routines, are 
used in parts of the literature on management and 
business as well as that on quality improvement and 
safety management, but with different meanings. 
The term ‘asset’ is used to refer to tangible and in-
tangible items that can be owned – and therefore also 
includes knowledge and information systems. Items 
that can be owned will by inference have a value to 
their owners – otherwise there is no point in owner-
ship. By ‘resources’ we aim to capture tools and 
competencies that make it possible to make use of 
assets and without which assets may not have their 
value. Resources include cognitive and social capital 
and thus the specific skills and competencies that 
people have for making use of other resources assets.  
The distinction between assets and resources is 
context dependent – so what counts as a resource in 
once context may be assets in another (say, ambu-
lances, software programs). Finally, ‘routines’ refers 
to both explicit procedures for doing things and to 
the informal practices people and communities have 
and which are not articulated in procedures and pre-
scriptions, yet shared as tacit background knowledge 
and know-how. Short definitions of these terms are 
the following:  
− an asset is an item of ownership that has exchange 
value and, more directly, has value to the com-
munity and the CI that serves the community; as-
sets include both physical entities as well as in-
tangibles such as knowledge systems; 
− a resource is tool or competence required to carry 
out given tasks or achieving given objectives, in-
cluding making use of assets to achieve individ-
ual and shared goals; 
− a routine/practice is defined as the way things are 
done, possibly codified as an explicit procedure 
or a pattern of activities with no explicit proce-
dure. 
2.2 Resilience capacities 
Following Vurgin et al. (2010) and Kozine & Ander-
sen (2015), the resilience capacities can be classified 
into the following four groups: 
− Preventive capacity is the degree to which the sys-
tem is able to anticipate and prepare for a disrup-
tive event, e.g. by building other capacities, mon-
itoring and sensing, doing risk assessment, etc. 
− Absorptive capacity is the capacity to limit the ex-
tent of sudden performance reduction 
− Adaptive capacity is the degree to which the 
system is capable of self-organization for coping 
with the unexpected and of adjusting to novel 
conditions of operation 
− Restorative capacity is the degree of ease with 
which the system repairs after a shock or a 
disruption. 
2.3 Emergency Management Cycle 
We adopted the definition of the EM phases given in 
FEMA (2006) and reported in the following. 
Preparedness: The range of deliberate, critical 
tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and 
improve the operational capability to prevent, protect 
against, respond to, and recover from domestic inci-
dents. Preparedness is a continuous process involv-
ing efforts at all levels of government and between 
government and private-sector and non-
governmental organizations to identify threats, de-
termine vulnerabilities, and identify required re-
sources. 
Prevention: Actions taken to avoid an incident or 
to intervene to stop an incident from occurring, ac-
tions taken to protect lives and property, and apply-
ing intelligence and other information to a range of 
activities that may include countermeasures. 
Mitigation: Activities that are designed to reduce 
or eliminate risks to persons or property, or lessen 
the actual or potential effects or consequences of an 
incident. 
Response: The activities that address the short-
term, direct effects of an incident. Response also in-
cludes the execution of EOPs and of incident mitiga-
tion activities designed to limit the loss of life, per-
sonal injury, property damage, and unfavorable 
outcomes. 
Recovery: The development, coordination, and 
execution of service- and site-restoration plans for 
impacted communities and the reconstitution of gov-
ernment operations and services through individual, 
private-sector, non-governmental, and public assis-
tance programs. 
2.4 Inter-organizational approaches 
As EM involves a number of responders that should 
act in concerted actions under emergencies, two oth-
er levels of resilience capabilities should be distin-
guished: intra-organizational and inter-
organizational resilience capabilities. 
Inter-organizational capabilities should be identi-
fied according to what is shared between the organi-
zations involved in concerted actions. The READ 
project suggests the inter-organizational escalation 
model that helps identify the corresponding resili-
ence capabilities, as suggested by Kozine & Ander-
sen (2015) and depicted in Figure 1. To define inter-
organizational resilience capabilities, responders 
(organizations and organizational units) shall deter-
mine their mutual relationships in each of the rele-
vant pairwise relations, and in general, in each of the 
n-tuple relations of relevance. 
 
 
Figure 1. Levels of inter-organizational approach (taken from 
Kozine & Andersen, 2015) 
2.5 Classification of capabilities 
Following the MCEER framework (Bruneau, et al. 
2003) we also distinguish among the Types of CI re-
silience dimensions (subsystems/components): (1) 
Technical, (2) Organizational, (3) Social, and (4) 
Economic, (TOSE). 
This brings us to the final classification of the ca-
pabilities according to explained four criteria (Figure 
2). Social and Economical resilience dimensions are 
however out of scope of the present study. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Classification of capabilities 
 
The concepts defined in the previous section al-
low us now to shape an approach to building and 
maintaining the resilience of CI (Figure 3). Each of 
the four (high-level) resilience capacities – preven-
tive, absorptive, adaptive and restorative – is ensured 
by the availability of particular capabilities. Looking 
from below, each capability is built from three relat-
ed compounds: assets, resources, and practic-
es/routines. Further, each single capability contrib-
utes to one or more resilience capacities and is used 
in one or more phases of the EM cycle. A capability 
can contribute to the resilience of individual organi-
sations as independent (‘intra-organizational’), 
and/or enable different levels of collective approach-
es (‘inter-organizational’) through sharing infor-
mation, activities and resources, power or even au-
thority. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Building system resilience (adapted from Kozine & 
Andersen, 2015) 
3 CASE DESCRIPTION 
To test the practical suitability of the READ frame-
work and the functionalities of the tool, the case of 
Lombardy Region (Italy) Public-Private Collabora-
tion and Programme for CI Resilience has been se-
lected as a pilot case. For the sake of this paper, we 
did not refer to the full case, which is still in pro-
gress, but we selected a reduced piece of collected 
data for demonstration purposes only. Our aim here 
is just to describe the applicability of the framework 
and the functionalities of the related tool by referring 
to realistic elements and conditions, as reported in 
the next section. 
3.1 Lombardy Region CIP-R Programme 
Lombardy (Lombardia in Italian) is one of the 20 
Italian regions, located in the north. A sixth of Italy's 
population lives in Lombardy (around 10 million cit-
izens) and it accounts for around 20% of Italy's 
GDP, making it the most populous and richest re-
gion in the country and one of the richest in Europe.  
To establish a risk-informed policy making process, 
the Regional Administration launched in 2007 a 
four-year research programme named "PRIM – Inte-
grated Regional Program for the mitigation of major 
risks" (Lombardy Region, 2007). Considering the re-
sults of PRIM study, it became evident that hazards 
identified over the territory, not only can threat the 
citizen life, but can also cause severe disruptions of 
infrastructure service continuity inducing wide cas-
cading effects. As a consequence, following the re-
lease of the EC Directive 2008/114/EC (EC, 2008), 
the Lombardy Region Administration decided to set 
up a preliminary study to investigate critical infra-
structures vulnerability and to assess current emer-
gency practices in the sector. 
It emerged that there is a great potential for an in-
crease in the flow of shared information regarding 
criticality and accidents, which can increase efficien-
cy of the invested resources and bring an improve-
ment in the security level. The objective of the Lom-
bardy region policy on CIP-R is therefore not to add 
new mechanisms or control processes, but to pro-
mote and advance inter-institutional and inter-
organizational collaboration. In light of this logic, 
from 2010 Lombardy Region has launched a pro-
gramme of activities aimed at defining a model of 
integrated and shared management, capable of sup-
porting a higher level of collaboration within the 
processes of prevention, risk monitoring and emer-
gency management related to the regional CI. The 
programme, based on a specific Memorandum of 
Understanding, involves today 16 operators of the 
energy and transport sectors. 
3.2 Type and characteristics of regional CI systems 
The regional CI systems that have been taken into 
consideration in the present study include: 
− Transport infrastructures: 
− Roads, highways, beltways and related assets 
(4 operators); 
− Rail – national and regional railway network, 
major train stations and control centers, met-
ro system (6 operators); 
− Air – the 3 major airports in the region (2 op-
erators); 
− Energy infrastructures: 
− Electricity – the main points of connection 
between the high and medium voltage net-
works (transmission and distribution), zones 
of distributed generation, control rooms (3 
operators). 
− Gas – main plants and dispatching networks 
(2 operators). 
3.3 Mapping of emergency management processes 
and vital node analysis 
The preliminary study, carried out by a team of aca-
demics and consultants in 2011, provided a complete 
picture of the actual status of the vulnerability of re-
gional CI nodes and the corresponding emergency 
management processes adopted by the most im-
portant CI operators. More specifically, the study fo-
cused on: 
− Carrying out a census of the most relevant CI 
nodes; globally more than 200 regional nodes 
have been identified and documented; 
− Analysis of the accidents influencing regional CI 
and creating a series of historical cases; 
− Mapping the Emergency Management organiza-
tional models and operational processes of the 
main CI operators active in the region. 
Thanks to the implementation of a functional simu-
lation model (Trucco et al. 2012) of the regional in-
frastructural system a systematic vital node analysis 
was carried out that returned a ranking list of the 
most critical nodes, or clusters of nodes. 
3.4 Thematic Task-Forces (TTF) 
TTFs represent the backbone of the programme im-
plementation; they are established and coordinated 
by a higher level PPP Governance Committee which 
is formed by the managing directors from all of the 
organizations that signed the MoU. 
So far, five TTFs have been established starting from 
January 2011. One focused on mapping of the in-
formation flows and communication channels 
among actors. Another focused on developing col-
laborative procedures for coping with major meteor-
ological events (e.g. heavy snowfall). The third one 
was in charge to set up collaborative activities in 
case of large blackout events. The fourth analyzed 
the regional CI nodes with respect to natural hazards. 
The objective of the fifth TTF was the definition of a 
new system for information exchange under emer-
gency, and the identification of the rules for en-
gagement. 
As for TTFs focused on specific accident scenarios, 
they adopted the same methodological approach, 
substantially organized into three steps: 
− development of vulnerability and resilience stud-
ies; 
− identification of best practices and innovative so-
lutions for risk mitigation through collaboration 
between actors, where opportunities for enhanc-
ing information sharing were particularly investi-
gated and promoted; 
− design, validation and implementation of collabo-
rative emergency plans; 
3.5 Data sources 
All the above mentioned activities and processes are 
documented by a wide set of documents, databases 
and SW applications. The data used in the present 
study was collected from the following sources: 
− bilateral agreements (Memorandums of Under-
standing) between Lombardy Region and CI Op-
erators; 
− reports on the activities and outcomes of TTFs: 
− A catalogue of regional CI nodes; 
− Vulnerability and resilience analysis of the re-
gional CI; 
− Description of relevant scenarios and analysis 
of historical cases; 
− Mapping of the information flows and commu-
nication channels among actors; 
− Information exchange system (SUSI) documen-
tation. 
− interviews with CI Operators and Directorates of 
the Lombardy Region involved in the pro-
gramme. 
4 THE READ TOOL FOR CAPACITY 
ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING 
In this section, we present the key features and the 
functionalities of the tool that translates the READ 
framework for the integration of CI resilience capa-
bilities in the emergency management set-up (the 
tool prototype was implemented in MSAccessTM). 
4.1 Phase 1: System and environment specification 
In the initial phase, the characteristics of the system 
under analysis, the organisational and environmental 
contexts must be specified. In this part, the users 
should go through a few setup steps, namely: 
1) System definition, which consists of: 
− Specification of each single organization, 
classified by type and role; 
− Specification of the technological infrastruc-
ture (Classes, Types and Assets); 
− Specification of relevant Hazards & Threats 
(a default taxonomy is provided, which is ed-
itable); 
− Documentation of the existing types of capa-
bilities and their classification (as in Tables 
1, 2); 
2) Accident Events Specification, where different 
possible future events can be described and doc-
umented as the scenario of reference for the next 
assessment and planning phases (e.g. electrical 
blackout event, heavy snowfall and flooding 
event). 
3) Asset Vulnerability Analysis, where for each asset 
its vulnerability is defined for each of the acci-
dents of interest. 
 
 
Table 1: Examples of capability specification 
Capability Elements Context 
Communication 
and Infor-
mation Sharing 
Assets: Information ex-
change system (SUSI); map 
of multi-actor information 
flows during disaster man-
agement 
Resources: Personnel in the 
control rooms (CI) and Situ-
ation Room (Civil protec-
tion); social media and other 
web resources.  
Routines: Information shar-
ing protocol and procedure 
Regional 
Government 
and partners 
(CI opera-
tors) 
Capability Elements Context 
Evacuation of 
passengers 
Assets: Installations of 
emergency light and ventila-
tion 
Resources: Airport person-
nel and fleets; replacement 
of transport services using 
buses 
Routines: Evacuation and 
Emergency procedure; Air-
port Passenger Contingency 
Plan 
Airport 
operator 
Communicating 
with the public 
Assets: Information to users 
with all active and passive 
channels available (various 
messaging, network, toll 
free number, SMS, company 
website). 
Resources: Staff and  
other resources at emergen-
cy sites to redirect  
traffic and intervene. 
Routines: Communication 
plan capable of informing 
users of the location and 
type of emergency 
Road 
operator 
Backup 
transport 
means 
Assets: Agreements for re-
placement services with bus 
companies wherever possi-
ble. 
Resources: Bus fleets and 
drivers of road transport 
companies. 
Routines: Internal process 
for back-up service activa-
tion and SLA on respon-
siveness. 
Rail 
operator 
4.2 Phase 2: Assessment of Resilience Capabilities  
After the system specification, the user moves into 
the ‘Resilience Assessment’ module of the tool. Re-
ferring to a specific accident event at a time, the us-
ers assign different types of capabilities to organiza-
tions - e.g. ATM, the Urban Transport Company, or 
Civil Protection -, describing in which way the capa-
bility is specifically implemented in each organiza-
tion (assets-resources-routines). An assessment is al-
so given on the current and the target (i.e. desired) 
level of this capability as planned by the correspond-
ing organization (Annex A). It is important to men-
tion that the capability assessment is done consider-
ing the vulnerability of assets to the accident in 
question (as specified in Phase 1). The capability 
levels are defined as: 
− Missing (0); 
− Very Low (1); 
− Low (2); 
− Medium (3); 
− High (4); 
− Very High (5). 
 
Table 2: Examples of capabilities of different organ-
izations in the case application 
Organiza-
tion type  
Capability  
Description 
Classification* 
EM
 C
yc
le
 
R
es
ili
en
ce
  
D
im
en
sio
n 
R
es
ili
en
ce
  
C
ap
ac
ity
 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l  
Le
ve
l 
Civil  
Protection 
Communication 
and Information 
Sharing 
Pp, 
Mi, 
Re, 
Rc 
T, O Ab, 
Ad, 
I 
Rail 
operator 
Backup  
Electricity 
Mi 
Re 
Rc 
T Ab i 
Metro 
Operator 
Backup 
transport means 
Mi, 
Re, 
Rc 
O Ab, 
Ad, 
Re 
i, I 
Airport 
Operator 
Evacuation of 
passengers 
Mi 
Re 
T, O Ab i, I 
Electricity 
operator 
Communication 
to the public 
Pp 
Re, 
Rc 
T, O Ab, 
Ad 
i 
* EM Cycle = Preparedness (Pp), Prevention (Pv), Miti-
gation (Mi), Response (Re), Recovery (Rc). 
 Resilience dimension = Technical (T), Organis. (O) 
 Resilience Capacity = Preventive (Pr), Absorptive 
(Ab), Adaptive (Ad), Restorative (Re). 
 Organizational level = intra-org (i), inter-org (I) 
 
After all the capabilities are assigned to organiza-
tions and the assessment completed, it is possible to 
give an overview of the current state of the overall 
system. The Resilience Capacity Analysis function 
shows the distribution of specific capabilities 
throughout the organization types and levels, as well 
as their compounds for selected accident events. 
4.3 Phase 3: Capability building cycle 
The capability building cycle is the process through 
which the system resilience is enhanced. It consists 
of four steps (Figure 4): 
1) In the first step the current state of the resilience 
capabilities is assessed – situation AS IS; 
2) In the second step a Gap Analysis is performed 
where the gaps in the capabilities are identified 
considering the accidents and related system vul-
nerabilities. Based on the analysis, a target value 
for each capability is deliberated. Target values 
aim to cover all the gaps and make the system 
completely fitting with its exposure to the con-
text. 
3) In the third step, the objectives are set, and the 
implementation plan is decided upon. Objective 
values identify the expected improvements to be 
achieved during the next planning cycle, hence 
they could be lower than the target values. 
4) The fourth step (which is also the first step of the 
next planning cycle) is where the resilience capa-
bilities are reassessed and reviewed after a single 
improvement cycle. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Capability building cycle 
 
The Gap Analysis is not tied to a specific accident 
but to the overall EM and resilience state, including 
all involved organizations. It is shown as a matrix 
(EM phases vs. Resilience Capacities) summarizing 
the capability gaps (the difference between the Tar-
get and the Current level) for each field, taking into 
account every Organization-Capability couple. The 
Gap Analysis shows the analyst a comprehensive 
picture giving quantitative indicators, enabling him 
to easily identify the weak points (Annex A). It is al-
so a clear clue about where the future improvements 
should be focused, considering EM phases against 
the resilience capacities. The ‘detailed list’ option is 
also able to show the full details on each of the ca-
pabilities. 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we presented a novel approach to inte-
grating the resilience capacities of CI into the EM 
cycle, which facilitates emergency services and CI 
operators to collaborate in addressing resilience im-
provement measures, while planning to cope with CI 
disruptions. It grounds on a comprehensive frame-
work (Kozine & Andersen, 2015), which reflects the 
main characteristics of such emergencies (e.g. inter-
dependent, multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholder) and 
supports the identification, assessment and develop-
ment of specific technical and organizational capa-
bilities. The test case we prepared, based on a piece 
of data collected for preparation of a full pilot case 
in Lombardy Region (Italy), demonstrates the ap-
plicability of the approach and the functionalities of 
the software tool. The proposed approach and the 
tool were used to support the preparedness and col-
laborative planning activities in the context of the 
public-private partnership on CI Resilience in Lom-
bardy Region. The pilot application shown that, 
thanks to a unified model and capability classifica-
tion, different actors – energy or transport operators, 
first responders, etc. – were able to represent their 
resilience and coping capacities in a way that is more 
understandable by the partners and usable for joint 
emergency planning. It also demonstrated the power 
of the proposed approach in fostering multi-agency 
and multi-stakeholder collaboration, and information 
sharing. 
In the next steps of the ongoing research project, 
the tool will be tested in practice in two different 
contexts: 
− the preparedness activities carried out within the 
Public-Private Collaboration and Programme for 
CI Resilience in Lombardy Region (Italy); 
− a table-top exercise on the assessment of recovery 
strategies for CI disruption, involving some se-
lected EU stakeholders (emergency managers, 
civil protection authorities, first responders and 
CI operators). 
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ANNEX A - READ TOOL FUNCTIONALITIES AND USER INTERFACE 
 
A.1. Assessment of resilience capabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
A.2. Gap Analysis 
 
 
